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- refugees did.   ow ever, the price of this 
early start to employment was an early 
stop to language training. The mean 
duration of the language training of 
privately sponsored refugees was 2.7 
weeks less than for government-assisted 
refugees. 
Language Training 
Government-assisted refugees received 
living allowances while attending lan- 
guage classes, but privately sponsored 
refugees did not; they were generally 
supported by their sponsors. The trade- 
off between early employment and im- 
mediate language training was one of the 
most contentious issues within sponsor- 
ship groups and also among government 
settlement officers. The study found that, 
overall, government officials tended to 
give priority to language training, where- 
as sponsors tended to give priority to 
employment. Many sponsors interview- 
ed mentioned that the refugees them- 
selves gave priority to employment and 
economic independence. 
Furthermore, although language training 
itself was paid for by the government for 
both government-assisted and privately 
sponsored refugees, the study encount- 
ered allegations that government-assist- 
ed refugees were given priority for seats 
in language classes, on top of the fact that 
there was as much as a three to four 
month wait for seats. 
Other Differences 
~rivatel) sponsored refugees had the 
assistance of their sponsors in finding 
jobs. Government-assisted refugees had 
government support while they studied 
Enelish or French These conclusions " 
point to a larger problem of inequitable 
treatment of refugees. Levels of material 
support given to privately sponsored 
refugees varied according to sponsors; 
those given to government-assisted refu- 
gees varied according to local CEC's 
interpretations of guidelines. Moreover, 
some CEC officers noted that privately 
sponssred refugees sometimes express 
ed resentment at receiving less than 
government-assisted refugees; for instance, 
they were often given hand-me-down 
clothes instead of money for new items. 
Some refugees were trobbled by feeling 
indebted to a private benefactor, some 
CEC officers noted, and preferred receiv- 
ing monies on the basis of government 
entitlement. 
Refugees' material dependence on spon- 
sors may pose problems for the emotional 
relationship between refugees and spon- 
sors, one of the studies (based on in- 
depth interviews with sponsors) suggest- 
e d  On the sponsors' part, it may reinforce 
a paternalistic and possessive attitude. 
On the refugees' part, it may induce 
dependency, suspicion, or even dis- 
honesty. If all refugees were entitled to 
certain basic funds fr0.m the government, 
the study suggests, these emotional 
dangers might be less significant; and the 
problem of inequity would be amelio- 
rated. 
Cost 
The average cost of settling a privately 
sponsored refugee was $753 less than for 
a government-assisted refugee, the study 
found. Private sponsors spent an average 
of $1,347 per refugee. The government 
spent an average of $2,100 on basic living 
allowances and language training allow- 
ances for each government-assisted refu- 
gee. 
The study suggests that the apparent 
savings of $753 is somewhat misleading 
since the questionnaire on which the 
statistic is based asked sponsors not to 
include material contributions such as 
donations of clothing and furniture in 
their summaries of their expenditures. 
However, it is even more misleading for 
the report to discount these savings in 
this way. Donations of used items do not 
represent expenditures in the same way 
cash disbursements do, and the distinc- 
tion is extremely important to finding 
ways to make refugee settlement cheaper. 
Willingness to  Sponsor Again 
The majority of sponsors of Indochinese 
refugees would sponsor again if they felt 
there were a need and if they felt sure that 
there would be sufficient money and 
help to see the sponsorship through, the 
study found. 
Fifty-nine per cent of sponsors surveyed 
indicated that they would be prepared to 
sponsor again; 2B0% indicated they might 
be; and 13% indicated they would not. 
Some of these sponsors cited specific 
conditions that would have to be met for 
them to be willing to sponsor again. Their 
most important concern involved need, 
with sponsors saying such things as, 
"I would sponsor again if a real 'need' can 
be demonstrated. I am not totally con- 
vinced that all the Indochinese were 
'refugees in the true sense"; and "1 
would sponsor again if I were satisfied 
that, given world-conditions, it is those 
refugees who are most in need of our 
help who are being admitted to 
Canada." 
Their second most important concerns 
involved means: sponsors wanted to be 
sure that there would be more govern- 
ment and agency support services avail- 
able; that there would be an equitable 
sharing of workload; and that there 
would be adequate funds for the spon- 
sorship. 
In this connection it is interesting to note 
that a willingness to sponsor again was 
more likely to be expressed by sponsors 
associated with a church as a parent 
organization. Some churches and other 
national organizations had signed um- 
brella agreements with the federal 
government to facilitate sponsorship by 
their constituent groups. These umbrella 
agreements simplified the bureaucratic 
procedures of sponsorship and assured 
sponsors of back-up assistance in case of 
an emergency. These assurances had 
often made the difference between choos 
ing whether or not to sponsor the first 
time around. 
Finally, government leadership was 
thought to be critical in motivating 
sponsors. Church leaders felt this was so, 
and sponsors and agencies attributed the 
present decline in sponsorship, not to a 
decline in public interest or willingness 
to sponsor, but to a lack of continuing 
government interest and leadership. 
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ports on the number of refugees follow- 
ing the recent invasion of Lebanon by 
IsraeL 
Israel Gravinsky, head of the Lebanese 
Relief Section within the Finance Mini- 
stry of Israeli government, was reported 
to have estimated that there were 20,000 
"roofless" people in Israeli-occupied 
southern Lebanon in July of 1982. The 
caption under a picture of a devastated 
Palestinian refugee camp south of Beirut 
published in an August issue of Newsview 
also reported that 20,000 people were left 
homeless by the Israeli invasion. On the 
other hand, a full-page advertisement in 
the New York Times, sponsored by the Ad 
Hoc Committee in Defense of the Palesti- 
nian and Lebanese People, protested 
vehemently against the invasion which 
produced 700,000 refugees. An adver- 
tisement in the August New York Review of 
Books, sponsored by the American Friends 
Service Committee, solicited donations 
to help the 600,000 refugees resulting 
from the recent attack on the Palestinians 
and Lebanese. 
How many refugees were there in Lebanon 
following the invasion? 20,000 or 700,000? 
To answer the question in a useful and 
accurate way that can contribute to 
planning relief, you have to categorize 
the refugees according to their siFations 
and clarify terminology accordingly. 
First you must distinguish Lebanese 
nationals, who would technically be 
described as internally displaced per- 
sons, from Palestinians in Lebanon. The 
Lebanese in turn have to be divided into 
five groups: 
(1) those in southern Lebanon 
whose homes were destroyed or so 
damaged as to be uninhabitable as 
a result of the Israeli invasion In 
August 1982, there were approxi- 
mately 250 homes destroyed in 
Tyre and four times that many in 
Sidon, resulting in about 6,250 
Lebanese refugees or "roofless 
nationals" in southern Lebanon. 
(2) those who, as a result of the 
Israeli defeat of the Palestinians in 
southern Lebanon, returned to 
homes destroyed or so damaged as 
to be uninhabitable as a result of 
the civil war and, in particular, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) conflict with Lebanese in 
1975-76 and after. Six hundred 
Lebanese Christians have returned 
to the town of Damour, which was 
occupied and totally destroyed by 
the PLO in the 1975-76 war. Of the 
6,000 people who once lived there, 
some have found new homes, but 
many have been in temporary 
shelters and may wish t r ~  return. 
These estimated 5,000 Lebanese 
refugees are also "roofless nation- 
als", but their situation predated 
the Israeli invasion; even though 
some are still "roofless", they can 
be said to have benefited from the 
war because they have at least 
regained their land on which they 
Dear Mr. Axworthy, 
In the Toronto Star of October 6. 1982. 
your advisor on immigration, Ian knkin;  
suggests that Canada's refugee intake 
will be reduced in response to financial 
constraints of the federal government In 
the Globe andMail of October 7,1982, you 
suggest that a reduction is being consid- 
ered in response to our unemployment 
problems. Neither rationalization is valid 
keducing Canada's refugee intake be- 
cause of these economic constraints is 
both inappropriate and unnecessary. 
It may be one thing to reduce overall 
immigration levels in response to high 
unemployment in Canada. It is quite 
another to reduce the refugee intake. 
People who are persecuted; people who 
are stateless; people who are mired in the 
hopelessness of refugee camps, should 
not suffer further from our economic 
problems. Canadians' problems are fairly 
minor bv com~arison. It should not be 
forgotten that unemployment levels were 
invoked to keep out Jewish refugees in 
the 1930's. 
As for the financial constraints of the 
government, reductions in unnecessary 
government expenditures should be 
made whenever possible, in good times 
and in bad. But reductions should not be 
made at the expense of refugees. Fortu- 
nately, we know that we can reduce the 
costs of resettling refugees without re- 
ducing the numbers of refugees we take 
in. How? The research reports of your 
ministry point the way. By combining the 
can rebuild their homes. 
(3) those who were refugees as a 
result of the 1975-76 war but who 
recovered their homes and their 
lands following the invasion. 50,000 
Lebanese refugees from Nabitieh 
returned to that city following the 





human support of private sponsors wit1 
government financial resources. 
Privately sponsored Indochinese refu 
gees were resettled at a direct cost o 
approximately one third less than govern 
ment-assisted refugees. This was no 
because the private sector was mort 
efficient The employees of your depart 
ment working in this field were dedicat 
ed, knowledgeable and extraordinaril; 
hard-working. But civil servants canno 
be expected to look for an old unuser 
chest of drawers in their aunt's basemen 
or to rustle up jobs and housing througl 
friends and acquaintances. By adopting 
new model for sponsorship that woul~ 
involve private sponsors in the resettle 
ment of every refugee in Canada, wt 
could bring in the number of refugee 
we brought in last year for the reduce, 
amount of money that is available thi 
year. 
The annual refugee plan could be estab 
lished on the understanding that th 
private sector would participate fully i, 
meeting the levels in the plan. If sufficier 
effort were forthcoming on the part of th 
private sector, then, since the costs fc 
resettling each refugee would be highe: 
the intake would be reduced to fit in wit: 
the budget allocations for refugee reset 
tlement. 
Such a plan might include the followin 
provisions: 
1. All refugees brought into th 
country during the first half of th 
@ 'ring 
(4) those who have fled Beirut and 
are temporarily without shelter. 
30,000 -60,000 citizens of West 
Beirut have fled the city, some of 
whom have lost their homes, but 
the majority of whom have simply 
fled the battle scene and are tempo- 





technically be described as temp* 
rarily displaced persons. 
(5) those whose homes are des- 
troyed or so damaged as to be unin- 
habitable as a result of the Israeli - 
PLO fighting in West Beirut 
(6) those whose homes were d e s  
troyed in the internecine fighting in 
year would be privately sponsored, 
with the exception of any urgent 
cases for which sponsors were not 
forthcoming. Based on the number 
of sponsorship applications made, 
projections would be made for the 
second half of the year to indicate 
the amount of the refugee resettle- 
ment budget that would be needed 
for the sponsorships involving 
private groups. Any remaining 
funds would be spent on direct 
government sponsorship of refu- 
gees. In this way, the total intake 
would be a direct reflection of the 
efforts of the private sector. 
2. All private sponsorship groups 
would receive a basic allowance of 
$500.00 from the government for 
each refugee sponsored within the 
levels tabled in Parliament 
3. The allowance would be in- 
creased by $500.00 if the refugee 
sponsored did not have a mini- 
mum proficiency in English or 
French. 
4. The allowance would be increas 
ed by $500.00 if the sponsorship 
group did not share with the 
refugee some kinship such as family, 
ethnic or religious identification. 
5. A further $500.00 per refugee 
would be available in a back-up 
fund to be disbursed to sponsors 
upon proof of necessary expendi- 
tures beyond the basic allowances. 
6. Private sponsors would provide 
the government with audited state- 
ments of their expenditures, indi- 
cating that any funds left over from 
the allowances had been donated 
to an approved charity involved in 
assisting refugees (e.g., a church or 
a refugee aid organization). 
This model undoubtedly has some 
shortcomings, and it is only one of many 
possibilities. But we do not have to solve 
the problem of a specific model at this 
time. Legislation requires only that the 
levels for refugee intake be tabled in 
Parliament The same levels as last year 
could be tabled with the clear under- 
standing that the resettlement efforts will 
have to be undertaken within greater 
financial constraints; and that therefore, 
in order to meet the levels, the involve- 
ment of the private sector will be needed. 
The private sector can then be invited to 
work out an effective plan for meeting 
the levels within the government's finan- 
cial constraints - a plan which at the 
same time can be fairer to sponsors and 
more effective for refugees. 
Yours Sincere1 y, 
Howard Adelman 
West Beirut. The numbers of such 
Lebanese citizens are estimated in 
the thousands. 
Thus, it is accurate but terribly mislead- 
ing to say that there were over 100,000 
Lebanese refugees following the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon. There may have 
been 100,000 Lebanese citizens uprooted 
in the turmoil in Lebanon in the past few 
years, but the situations of these people, 
the causes of their situations and their 
present needs, differ radically. 
If reports on the Lebanese refugees are 
confusing, those on the Palestinians are 
even more so. Some Palestinians are 
registered refugees: basically those who 
arrived in 1948 following the creation of 
the State of Israel, and their children. 
These refugees are entitled to rations and 
benefits from the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East (UNRWA). Some are 
unregistered: basically those who arrived 
in 1970 following King Hussein's slaught- 
er of the PLO in Black September. Other 
Palestinian refugees have become Leba- 
nese citizens but have never been struck 
from the official rolls of UNRWA. 
Furthermore, the basic information on 
camp populations before the invasion is 
confusing. For example, the official p o p  
ulation of the camp that was totally razed, 
Ein Hilweh, was 24,340 refugees. How- 
ever, an UNWRA official said that since 
1969 the PLO had not allowed them to 
check their figures. Deaths were often not 
reported and to compensate for this, 
UNRWA had adopted a policy of not 
registering more than five children in a 
family unless a death was also registered. 
Some registered Palestinians had moved 
into town or were working abroad in 
Bahrain or Kuwait or Abu Dhabi and had 
leased their camp homes to Egyptian or 
Syrian migrant workers. Also, PLO vol- 
unteers from Pakistan and Bangladesh 
lived in the camp. In addition, it is 
estimated that as many as 10,000 unregis- 
tered refugees lived in the camp, inclu- 
ding many militants and their families. 
The destruction of Ein Hilweh alone can 
be estimated to have produced as many 
ds 30,000 "roofless refugees", most of 
whom would be stateless Palestinians. 
According to UNRWA there are approxi- 
mately 107,000 registered refugees living 
in southern Lebanon, of whom around 
60,000 lived in camps and 47,000 in 
towns and cities. Some refugee camps 
were only slightly damaged in the fight- 
ing and Palestinians, both registered and 
unregistered, remained in those camps. 
On the other hand, Ein Hilweh in Sidon 
and Rashidieh in Tyre were completely 
destroyed in the battle between the 
Israelis and the PLO. El-Buss and Burj el- 
Cont. 011 page 8 
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Shemalia were severely damaged. Over- 
all of these 60,000 registered refugees in 
camps in the south, and possibly another 
25,000 unregistered refugees in camps 
there, the most reliable estimates indicate 
that as many as one-half or 42,000 may 
have lost their homes. In addition, it is 
estimated that there were approximately 
80,000 Palestinian refugees living in the 
West Beirut and Mount Lebanon area of 
whom around 18,000 lived in camps. As 
of this writing, the extent of destruction 
of these camps is not known but it is 
probably very extreme. Even if we 
assume that all refugees living in camps 
in this area lost their homes in the 
bombardment, then the total number of 
homeless Palestinian refugees in all of 
Lebanon in August 1982 would have 
been a maximum of 60,000. 
In its report on the situation in Lebanon 
following the Israeli invasion, the United 
Nations indicated that 300.000 Lebanese 
needed aid, a figure that included Lebanese 
in all of Lebanon who had suffered losses 
of schools, pock-marked homes, psycho- 
logical trauma, etc. In its news release 
announcing aid to Lebanon the Canadian 
National Development Agency notes 
that "UNRWA, which has responsibility 
for the more than 200,000 registered 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, esti- 
mates that the vast majority of them have 
been displaced, with refugee camps 
being razed." In addition there are an 
estimated 100,000 unregistered Palesti- 
nian refugees in Lebanon. Thus, if you do 
not distinguish among the various mean- 
ings of the word "refugee" - if you do 
not distinguish among "stateless" and 
"homeless" and "in n e e d  - then you 
can say that there are 600,000 refugees in 
~ebanbn following the Israeli iniasior 
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(though not strictly as a result of i IL 
Israeli invasion). 
But if you wish to specify what aid is 
required, and therefore wish, for example, 
to say how many Lebanese and Palesti- 
nians are homeless as a result of the 
lsraeli invasion of Lebanon, then an 
accurate figure will be 10,000 Lebanese 
and 50,000- 60,000 Palestinians. Probab- 
ly another 30,000 people in southern 
Lebanon have had to temporarily flee 
their homes in order to avoid the fight- 
ing. At the same time, 60,000 will have 
recovered their homes and another 6,000 
will have recovered their land. Policy and 
rehabilitation efforts should be decided 
on the basis of as accurate a set of facts as 
possible. 
"The introduction of an effective census 
mechanism to work independently of 
relief agencies in order to determine in 
an impartial and professional way the 
numbers of border-crossers requiring 
assistance in mass influx situations," is 
one of nine recommendations made by 
Sadruddin Aga Khan in his report Human 
Rights and Massive Exoduses, which will be 
summarized in the next issue of Refuge. 
Howard Adelman visited Lebanon in August 
1982 and published a report entitled Home- 
less Refugees and Displaced Persons in 
Southern Lebanon, Resulting from the 
lsraeli Invasion of Lebanon, June 1982. 
The report may be obtained by sending $2.50 
for the report alone, $5.00 for the report with 
selected appendices, or $20.00 for the report 
with full appendices to: Refugee Documenta- 
tion Project, York University, 4700 Keele 
Street, Downsview, Ontario M3J 2R6. 
CANADIAN FINANCIAL AID 
TO LEBANON 
Canada has contributed $2.55 million 
for humanitarian relief in Lebanon since 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 
1982. A grant of $950,000 has been 
allocated to the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refu- 
gees in the Near East (UNRWA), which is 
responsible for registered Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon. The funds are to be 
used to provide food, shelter and cloth- 
ing. Another $450,000 has been granted 
to the United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), for assistance to homeless 
mothers and children, mainly in south- 
ern Lebanon and the Beirut area. One 
million dollars has been granted to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
for relief to displaced Lebanese civilians. 
Finally, $150,000 has been granted to the 
World Council of Churches for humani- 
tarian assistance to people in southern 
Lebanon, Beirut, and the Beka'a Valley. 
